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ABSTRACT
Energy markets are undergoing significant changes. Legacy systems developed
around inflexible, centralized and monodirectional supplies are being replaced by
flexible, distributed and bidirectional supply-and-demand systems. Where legacy
systems are less entrenched, such as in decentralized renewable energy, flexibility
and energy service markets, the pace of change is faster, and new technologies, busi-
ness models and ideas are more likely to be tested and applied. This conceptual paper
analyzes the changing governance of decentralized renewable energy, flexibility and
energy services in the United Kingdom from a transaction cost perspective. Partic-
ular emphasis is placed on the impact of potentially disruptive innovations such as
distributed ledgers, emerging digital technologies and big data analytics on the one
hand, and the need for value creation from just and affordable decarbonization on
the other. In doing so, this paper sheds light on some contradictions between current
energy governance and the requirements for a decarbonized, decentralized, digital-
ized and democratized energy system. The paper concludes that energy governance is
increasingly shaped by decentralization and digitalization, which can either facilitate
or inhibit value creation through democratization (social value) and decarbonization
(environmental value).
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1 INTRODUCTION
According to the World Energy Council (2017a), global energy systems are being
transformed by the three reinforcing trends of decarbonization, decentralization
and digitalization. This paper also includes democratization in its analysis because
transformative trends might have negative consequences relating to equity, acces-
sibility and affordability if value creation is monopolized by rent-seeking organi-
zations. Energy system transformation is thus encapsulated by the so-called 4Ds
(Hoggett 2018): decarbonization, decentralization, digitization and democratiza-
tion. This paper focuses on the energy governance implications of the 4Ds with a
particular focus on digital innovations.
Energy governance combines energy law, regulation and policy, which enable or
constrain innovation (Kuzemko et al 2016; Lockwood et al 2017). In the United
Kingdom, energy governance arguably tends toward path dependencies and techno-
logical lock-ins, which is particularly evident in the continued support for nuclear
power (Johnstone et al 2017). At the same time, large, inflexible, centralized,
monodirectional and supply-focused market structures dominated by legacy infras-
tructures, technologies and supply chains are being challenged by an increasing
emphasis on facilitation and citizen involvement (Eyre and Lockwood 2016; Green
Alliance 2017; Sandys et al 2018; World Energy Council 2017a).
Data availability, accumulation, management and analytics are often considered to
be key determinants in the success of new energy system architecture (BEIS/Ofgem
2017; Mitchell 2017; Sandys et al 2018). Distributed ledger technologies (DLTs),
such as blockchain, and emerging digital innovations, such as smart sensors, smart
meters, the internet of things (IoT) and artificial intelligence (AI), are increas-
ingly automating and digitizing measurement, reporting, verification and account-
ing infrastructures (World Bank 2018). Combined with executing smart contracts,
such digital innovations ostensibly facilitate the deep learning required for more
accurate time series predictions and the automation of peer-to-peer (P2P) trading,
demand management, demand-side response (DSR), flexibility and carbon account-
ing (DAO–IPCI 2018; EnergiMine 2018; EWF 2018; Flexitricity 2018; World Bank
2018).
In the United Kingdom, as elsewhere, there is also an understanding that embed-
ding digital innovations into, or overlaying them onto, existing energy systems is not
sufficient to achieve long-term 4D objectives, because current energy governance has
been designed around value creation from fossil-fuel generation and supply-focused
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markets as well as data security implications (Sandys et al 2018). A new fit-for-
purpose system embedding the 4Ds will need to be more marketized, with all aspects
of energy (non-)use being monitored, and capable of integrating a range of techno-
logical, economic and social innovations by prioritizing transparency, flexibility and
a focus on people through regulatory reform (Mitchell 2017; Ofgem 2017a; Sandys
et al 2018).
Rather than competitive efficiencies and paying per unit of generated electricity,
new payment approaches are necessary to reward flexibility, DSR, demand reduc-
tions and the accumulation of measured, reported, verified and certified carbon
emission mitigations (Green Alliance 2017; Ofgem 2017a; Sandys et al 2018; Stua
2017). Progressive energy market governance is thus essential for this redirection
of markets to derive value from decarbonized, decentralized and digitized outcomes
while ensuring meaningful consent through democratization, especially regarding
vulnerable members of society.
This paper provides an overview of the current situation, where energy gover-
nance comprising law, regulation and policy attempts to square grid code written for
large-scale generators and wholesale traders with the challenges of the 4Ds. This
implies an increasing emphasis on facilitating smart, flexible and distributed sys-
tems along with digital innovations, while dealing with an overall retreat of interven-
tionist capabilities that is providing decentralized actors with an increasing range of
opportunities. By conceptualizing digital innovations as transactional technologies,
this paper analyzes the transaction costs of governance arrangements of dis- and re-
intermediation associated with innovative decentralized renewable energy, flexibility
and energy services as well as a shift in the source and understanding of value.
This paper seeks to answer the following questions.
 How do digital innovations challenge the governance of decentralized renew-
able energy, flexibility and energy services?
 What is the role of UK energy law, regulation and policy in facilitating digital
innovations?
 Do digital innovations change the process of value creation in energy systems?
In answering these questions, the paper uses a social science approach that combines
a literature review, participant observations and interviews. The literature review pro-
vides an empirical basis on which to analyze the impact of digital innovation on UK
energy governance and value creation in energy systems more broadly, and to estab-
lish the conceptual framework for transaction cost analysis. Participant observation
and note-taking at conferences, such as Event Horizon 2018 in Berlin and Blockchain
Live in London, as well as closed meetings, where specifics of digital innovation
www.risk.net/journals Journal of Energy Markets
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implementation and energy governance implication were discussed, have comple-
mented the development of an empirical basis for analysis. Supplementary informal
and formal interviews have provided details on opportunities and shortfalls to help
develop a deeper understanding of the implications of digital innovation diffusion on
energy governance.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides background information
of UK energy governance. Section 3 introduces the key digital innovations that
are affecting energy market governance. Section 4 introduces the conceptual frame-
work of UK energy market governance and the analytical framework thereof, based
on transaction cost economics. Section 5 analyzes the governance of decentralized
renewable energy, flexibility and energy services in light of digital innovations. Sec-
tion 6 discusses the effects of digital innovations on UK energy governance and
associated value creation. Section 7 concludes.
2 UK ENERGY GOVERNANCE
Energy law in the UK concerns
the management of energy resources and the rights and duties over all energy activ-
ities over each stage of [the] energy life cycle and at the local, national and inter-
national level. This includes all of primary and secondary energy, renewable and
non-renewable energy and conventional and unconventional energy.
Heffron et al (2016)
Energy in the United Kingdom is regulated through acts such as the Electricity
Act 1989, the Energy Act 2004 and the Energy Act 2013 (DECC 2011; Eyre and
Lockwood 2016).
The UK’s overarching energy policy objectives are affordability, energy security
and sustainability (Sandys et al 2018). These objectives are underpinned by regu-
latory instruments, economic instruments and fiscal/financial instruments that play
different roles in energy markets (IEA 2018). Regulatory instruments are often reac-
tive in ironing out issues that arise in the market. Economic and fiscal instruments
such as feed-in tariffs and contracts for difference are often proactive through the
implementation of political promises and comparatively easy to both enforce and
end (House of Commons 2016; IEA 2018).
UK energy policy relating to these economic and fiscal instruments is often per-
ceived as erratic and unpredictable due to sudden changes reducing or removing
support, especially in renewable energy projects (Ernst and Young 2015; House of
Commons 2016). UK energy regulation, however, is perceived globally as leading
on regulatory reform (Sandys et al 2018). This can be traced back to liberalization
reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, which saw the United Kingdom’s heavily regulated
Journal of Energy Markets www.risk.net/journals
Transaction costs of innovation governance 5
supply market replaced by a competitive supply market through the privatization of
electricity and transmissions networks as well as the subsequent imposition of more
direct regulatory instruments on supposedly free-market structures in the 2000s, fol-
lowing their failure to deliver optimum outcomes to consumers and the environment
(Eyre and Lockwood 2016; Mitchell 2008; Pollitt 2010; Sandys et al 2018).
Carbon pricing was introduced in 2002 by the Department for Environment, Food
and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) in response to the EU Emissions Trading System, while
EU regulations such as Directive 2009/28/EC are credited with ambitious renewable
energy targets. Both, however, are outside of the framework of UK energy market
regulation (Eyre and Lockwood 2016; House of Commons 2018; Mitchell 2008;
Pollitt 2010). Recent changes in energy market regulation such as the United King-
dom’s Electricity Market Reform in the 2013 Energy Act have taken into account an
increasingly diverse range of supply technologies (Eyre and Lockwood 2016).
The latest EU Renewable Energy Directive (EU 2016a) and the 4th EU Electricity
Directive (under review: see Eyre and Lockwood (2016)) take this a step further
by providing more rights to individual and collective consumption, facilitated by
the increasing prevalence of decentralized and decarbonized generation technologies
(Eyre and Lockwood 2016, Article 21):
Member States shall ensure that renewable self-consumers, individually or through
aggregators, are entitled to: (a) generate renewable energy, including for their
own consumption, store and sell their excess production of renewable electricity,
including through power purchase agreements, electricity suppliers and P2P trading
arrangements.
Actual implementation is the responsibility of the Office of Gas and Electricity Mar-
kets (Ofgem), which acknowledges that “moving from a largely centralised, carbon-
intensive model to one which will be increasingly carbon-constrained, smart, flexible
and decentralised is creating challenges which can only be addressed by innovation”
(Ofgem 2016). To this end, it has been collaborating more and more with the UK
Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), especially in the
context of the security of network and information systems (BEIS/Ofgem 2017).
The result is that Ofgem and BEIS, along with individual district network oper-
ators (DNOs), are in the process of setting rules for smart and flexible energy sys-
tems in light of energy system transformation and digital innovations (BEIS/Ofgem
2017; Sandys et al 2018). There is an expectation that these new rules will address
the regulatory gap which fails to empower citizens as “prosumers” due to a lack of
clarity regarding the role of the individual in energy system transformation (Sain-
tier 2017). They should also help to mitigate the gap between current energy policy
and requirements for meeting the United Kingdom’s fourth and fifth carbon budgets
(CCC 2018). Table 1, which is taken from Mitchell (2018), indicates the Committee
on Climate Change’s expected progress indicators.
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TABLE 1 Committee on Climate Change’s expected progress indicators (Mitchell 2018).
2017/18 2030
Low carbon generation 52% >75%
as share of total
ULEVs as share of new <2.5% 60%
cars
Heat pumps in homes <200 000 2.5 million
Electrical storage 2.7 GW 8–38 GW
DSR 1 GW 4–18 GW
Carbon intensity of 265 gCO2/kWh <100 gCO2/kWh
electricity generation
ULEVs are ultra low emission vehicles.
Despite this increasing emphasis on regulatory reform in the United Kingdom, a
misalignment between policy-induced innovation and regulatory instruments persists
(Hoppe et al 2018; Saintier 2017). The result is that missing market rules and high
entry barriers are encouraging innovators and prosumers to push regulatory limits or
to seek/provide alternatives through grid and regulatory defection.
3 DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY, EMERGING DIGITAL
TECHNOLOGY AND BIG DATA ANALYTICS
As mentioned above, access to data is one of the key determinants in the develop-
ment of smart, flexible and low-carbon energy systems (BEIS/Ofgem 2017; Mitchell
2017; Sandys et al 2018). Data availability, accumulation, management and analyt-
ics will be greatly enhanced through digitalization, which encompasses the growing
application of information and communication technologies (ICT) across energy sys-
tems (IEA 2017). In the context of this paper, digitalization also includes DLTs, such
as blockchain, and emerging digital technologies (EDTs), such as the IoT and AI
(IEA 2017; World Bank 2018). Despite increasing awareness of the importance of
data, DLT and EDT, there is still significant uncertainty regarding the extent of their
application and impact.
3.1 Distributed ledger technology
DLTs and blockchain in particular have been touted as a potential catalyst for change
in a variety of markets, ranging from energy markets to climate markets (PwC 2016;
World Bank 2018; World Energy Council 2017b, 2018). As transactional technolo-
gies, DLTs facilitate market transactions and enhance connectivity by lowering trans-
action costs (Davidson et al 2016). Applications of DLT in the energy sector include
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grid management, certificate-of-origin trading, payment systems associated with
renewable energy and electric vehicle charging, and energy asset management, espe-
cially where the “provenance of an asset and the data from it [need] to be interrogated
and updated by multiple parities” (World Energy Council 2017a, p. 4).
3.2 Emerging digital technology
EDTs at the intersection of digitalization and energy include smart sensors, smart
meters, smart inverters, frequency relays and active dispatch capabilities, which
are often grouped together as elements of the IoT as well as AI. EDTs promise
highly integrated, interconnected and responsive energy systems. Analysis by the
International Energy Agency suggests that the curtailment of wind and solar pho-
tovoltaics (PV) can be reduced from 7% to 1.6% by 2040 with the help of EDTs
(IEA 2017). Flexibility, efficiency and reliability can thus be increased through
the exchange of operational information in real time between any interconnected
equipment anywhere in the energy system (IEA 2017).
3.3 Big data analytics
Big data analytics (BDA) of data provided by EDTs enables real-time (non-)usage
monitoring and prediction of early-stage problems, even before mechanical failure
interrupts operations. This can help reduce operation and maintenance (O&M) costs,
improve network efficiency, reduce unplanned outages and downtime, and extend the
operational lifetime of assets. Given the exponential growth in data, AI will play an
increasingly important role in managing data (IEA 2017).
4 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The digital innovations described in Section 3 are understood as transactional tech-
nologies in this paper, and the energy system they support may be described as
transactive energy, defined by Liu et al (2017) as
a system of economic and control mechanisms that allows the dynamic balance of
supply and demand across the entire electrical infrastructure using value as a key
operational parameter.
To promote the “convergence of technologies, policies and financial drives in an
active prosumer market where prosumers are buildings, EVs, microgrids, VPPs or
other assets” (Liu et al 2017) and the desire to remove barriers to realizing the value
of smart digital technologies (BEIS/Ofgem 2017) does not exclude the democratic
element of the 4Ds, this paper provides the following simplified analytical framework
of the United Kingdom’s current energy system governance (Figure 1).
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This analytical framework locates decentralized renewable energy at the inter-
section of policy/law/regulation and citizens and prosumers; flexibility at the inter-
section of grid infrastructure and policy/law/regulation; and energy services at the
intersection of grid infrastructure and citizens and prosumers.
The emergence of associated markets is driven by interactions between gover-
nance, which provides market frameworks, and innovators, who reduce transac-
tion costs by opening new markets and reorganizing industry (Anderson and Parker
2013; Schumpeter 1934). This analytical framework provides the basis for analyz-
ing the transaction costs of dis- and re-intermediation associated with the interac-
tions between digital innovations and innovative decentralized renewable energy,
flexibility and energy service market governance arrangements.
The analysis of transaction costs can be traced back to Coase (1937), who stated
that firms exist because of the transaction costs of using the markets. Transaction
costs are the costs incurred
to discover who it is one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to
deal and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading to a bargain, to draw up
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the contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the
contract are being observed, and so on.
Coase (1960, p. 15)
The mix of economic institutions for economic coordination is therefore deter-
mined by agents seeking to economize on transaction costs. Uncertainty (bounded
rationality) leads to contractual incompleteness. Williamson (1985) developed this
theory further by stating that hierarchical organizations (firms, left-hand side of Fig-
ure 2) reduce opportunism and are considered more transaction cost-efficient than
markets (right-hand side of Figure 2). Organizational form is largely shaped by
the need to control opportunism (the lack of trust). Therefore, governance exists to
counter the risk of opportunism (Davidson et al 2016; Williamson 1985).
According to this view, transactions are governed through structures located on a
spectrum with hierarchical organization (firms) at one end and spot markets at the
other (see Figure 2 (Pint and Baldwin 1997; Toffel 2002)).
While hierarchical organizations have lower transaction costs for vertically inte-
grated contracts (left-hand side of Figure 2), markets are often more efficient gov-
ernance institutions for spot contracts (right-hand side of Figure 2) (Williamson
1985). In a pure exchange economy, all contracts would be spot contracts. Economic
activity that requires coordinated investment over time (asset specificity and associ-
ated opportunism) along with management of uncertainty and frequency of dealings,
however, benefits from hierarchies and relational contracting (left-hand side of Fig-
ure 2) because they provide more efficient ways to deal with the hazards of oppor-
tunism. Because associated transactions are more efficiently conducted in hierar-
chies than markets, transaction costs determine the efficiency of different governance
institutions (Davidson et al 2016).
The inflexible and centralized legacy grid has traditionally monodirectionally sup-
plied electricity from utilities to customer’s sites (left-hand side of Figure 3). With
the diffusion of decentralized generation technology (such as solar PV) and chang-
ing business models (such as energy service companies), our dependency on util-
ities to deliver grid electricity (and fuel) is diminishing in favor of the supply of
useful energy provided by primary conversion equipment on-site or adjacent to the
customer (center-left of Figure 3).
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FIGURE 3 Delivered energy, useful energy and energy services on-site (Hannon and












































DLT, EDT and BDA are providing new openings and opportunities to govern
decentralized renewable energy, flexibility and energy services as well as secondary
market access. Governance structures are thus more likely to resemble markets. The
transaction costs for accessing such markets have traditionally been high for individ-
ual organizations, who are likely to prioritize their core business, and insurmount-
able for citizens and prosumers. Innovative energy service companies (ESCOs) are
increasingly providing access to such markets through technology specialization and
the application of DLT, EDT and BDA as transactional technologies. Rather than
conventional asset-based business models (top of Figure 1), these ESCOs seek to
provide asset-free platform business models capable of capturing monopoly rents.
5 CHANGING RETAIL ENERGY MARKETS
Decentralized renewable energy generation technologies lower transaction costs for
consumers to source an increasing share of electricity generation in-house (left-hand
side of Figure 2). This reduces their dependency on grid electricity and conventional
organizational structures such as utilities (left-hand side of Figure 3). Digital innova-
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tion combined with changing business models lowers transaction costs for innovative
ESCOs to provide flexibility, DSR and demand management services. Both trends
imply a change in the way the energy system is organized. The following section
analyzes how changes in decentralized renewable energy, flexibility and energy ser-
vices require a reassessment of UK energy system governance at both the citizen and
prosumer (bottom of Figure 1) and the policy/law/regulation levels (left-hand side of
Figure 1).
5.1 The governance of decentralized renewable energy
To date, the difficulty of managing electricity at the individual and household levels
(bottom of Figure 1) has implied that grid electricity regulated by Ofgem and sup-
plied by utilities remains the primary source of electricity (left-hand side of Figure 3).
At the same time, an increasing share of on-site generation supplements grid supply,
with exports deemed at a certain percentage of generation (bottom-left of Figure 3).
With the increasing availability of primary conversion equipment for electricity at
a diverse range of sites, the shift from a monodirectional supply of electricity from
the grid toward a bidirectional flow of electricity is underway (Green Alliance 2017;
Ofgem 2017a; Parag and Sovacool 2016; Sandys et al 2018).
The growing cost-effectiveness of solar-PV-plus-battery reinforces this trend by
increasing opportunities for on-site prosumption and managed grid exports (DECC
2015; Ofgem 2017a; REA 2016). With digital innovations supporting nano- and
microgrid experimentation and facilitating P2P electricity trading, further opportu-
nities for prosumption and supply at a local level are arising (Zhang et al 2017,
2018). Decreasing transaction rates provided by such digital innovations thus trans-
form the governance of decentralized renewable energy by enabling individuals and
communities to transact small amounts of energy in such microgrids.
Compared with electricity trading through public grid infrastructures, private wire
supply through microgrids requires the installation of dedicated physical electric-
ity transmission infrastructure. These arrangements are complex, requiring consid-
erable skills and the capacity to engage with appropriate network design, infra-
structure, installation costs, land and planning requirements, and operation and
maintenance, thus increasing both transaction and production costs (Sorrell 2007;
Stephens Scown/Regen SW 2016). Easton Energy Group in Bristol, for example, is
at the forefront of developing a community microgrid combining solar PV genera-
tion with battery storage and dedicated transmission infrastructure as part of their
TWOs project (Regen/10:10 Climate Action 2018).
The cost-effectiveness of such microgrid arrangements, however, remains doubt-
ful. A more diffusible approach seems to be platform organizations facilitating direct
connections between producers and consumers, with the aim of transforming current
www.risk.net/journals Journal of Energy Markets
12 C. Nolden
grid infrastructures through decentralized and trustless P2P or platform trading. On
April 12, 2018, the first ever electricity trade on the blockchain took place in the
United Kingdom by combining solar PV with battery storage and digital technolo-
gies provided by Verv in Hackney Banister House Estate (Verv 2018). The current
understanding appears to be that production cost savings only accrue to individuals
and communities engaging in such trades, with network charges and auxiliary costs
being socialized. A progressive view sees these actors as decentralized flexibility
providers in a more integrated energy system enabled by digital innovations (Sandys
et al 2018, p. 8):
Renewable energy is no longer marginal, but mainstream; distributed electricity gen-
erators, balancers and system service providers are multiplying; and non-energy
players in the technology and data sectors now view energy as an exciting new mar-
ket. Consumers will be the key drives acting as the crucial market makers rather than
market takers of today. As connected consumers, they are likely to be serviced by
new big data companies, demanding a new set of optimized outcomes that will throw
up new issues around the definition of security of supply, such as cyber security.
An emerging issue appears to be the need to enhance consumer, prosumer and cit-
izen awareness of the changing regulatory environment in light of rapid technolog-
ical advances lowering transaction costs across this increasingly transactive energy
system. The disintermediation of established market players appears to be a likely
consequence, to allow for the transaction of fairly small amounts of energy at very
local scales (shifting from the center of Figure 2 toward the right of Figure 2). In
addition, some form of reintermediation might be necessary to aggregate such trans-
actions to benefit the grid for engagement in flexibility services and to automate the
accounting of carbon emission mitigations.
5.2 The governance of flexibility
This reintermediation process describes a parallel trend of increasing on-site gener-
ation, customer and/or community-owned primary and secondary conversion equip-
ment, and a growing number and variety of ESCOs specializing in the development
of trading platforms for such flexibility services, such as Upside Energy, Flexitric-
ity, Limejump, Origami Energy and KiWi Power. These ESCOs take an asset-light,
data-driven approach to flexibility service delivery by using existing infrastructure to
provide demand-side and frequency response services, which are expected to deliver
benefits in the range of £17–40 billion to 2050 (Sanders et al 2016).
These complex management arrangements, involving a range of digital innova-
tions, combine spot market contracts (right-hand side of Figure 2) with more static
long-term (2–4-year) contracts for flexibility service delivery in the future (center of
Figure 2). These long-term energy service contracts only make sense if the sum of
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the production costs of accessing such secondary markets as well as the transaction
costs associated with governing their provision are lower than the in-house provision
(left-hand side of Figure 1).
Citizens, prosumers and small businesses are excluded from these markets due to
the high transaction costs of engaging with their small electricity loads. A 100 kW
threshold at the DNO level requires aggregation, but few ESCOs and other interme-
diaries appear to be ready to take on this challenge. At the same time, first-moving
ESCOs that succeed in reducing transaction costs and providing secondary mar-
ket access play an important role in establishing precedents and providing those
responsible for energy system governance with a clearer idea of how these emerging
markets function and how they need to be regulated.
To enable maximum flexibility, the bidirectional flow of data relies on a combi-
nation of storage, DSRs, interconnection and energy efficiency, which benefit from
enabling smart and digital innovations to reduce transaction costs (Pop et al 2018).
This points toward the emergence of paradoxical systems, where spot markets deter-
mine the trade of electricity (right-hand side of Figure 1) while the systems them-
selves more closely resemble vertically integrated governance platforms (left-hand
side of Figure 1). Facilitated by DLT and blockchain in particular, these intermedi-
ary platforms arguably provide the basis for establishing entirely new rule-governed
economic orders outside the traditional spectrum of governance structures between
hierarchies and markets (Davidson et al 2016; Pint and Baldwin 1997; Toffel 2002).
The full potential of digital innovations therefore lies in bypassing both hierarchies
(such as utilities delivering electricity) and established markets (such as the electric-
ity market regulated by Ofgem) by creating “institutional alternatives for coordinat-
ing the economic actions of groups of people” (Davidson et al 2016, p. 18). Yet, the
regulator still needs to keep an open mind about the possibilities and limitations of
both established and emerging technologies in future energy systems.
5.3 The governance of energy services
The governance of energy services, alongside advances in electricity generation and
storage technologies, flexibility and demand-side and frequency response services, is
also undergoing significant changes. If interoperable management capabilities were
to be rolled out at highly diverse scales, a reconceptualization of the grid and energy
service delivery in general might be necessary, as each component and each bound-
ary area scale, ranging from device via building to substation, ends up being a self-
contained ecosystem capable of providing services to the next layer in the system
(Bronski et al 2017).
Rather than self-contained microgrids, as in the case of Easton, such an infra-
structure would require interoperability driven by the hierarchy of grid voltages.
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This might imply a shift from spot (real-time) markets (right-hand side of Figure 2)
and futures (days to years ahead) markets toward automated responses with ex-post
settlements based on buying and selling transactional records (Bronski et al 2017).
The Energy Web Foundation has developed a blockchain-based transactive energy
implementation framework called the decentralized autonomous area agent (D3A)
market model; this enables all grid services to be provided from the bottom up
by a transactive energy service market capable of scaling to any level within the
grid and embedding decentralization, decarbonization and digitization. By increas-
ing choice, improving access and enabling participation, it might also contribute to
democratization (Bronski et al 2017).
Similar to this bottom-up approach to the delivery of energy services and the
development of a transactive market model, Sandys et al (2018) apply a backcasting
methodology to envision future energy market regulation from the socket upwards.
They foresee a transformation of energy service delivery into a “technicolour range
of opportunities and consumer propositions” (Sandys et al 2018). The success of this
vision, however, hinges on the interplay of energy market governance, ESCOs and
digital innovations to lower transaction costs for their delivery.
One increasingly prevalent argument in the context of lowering transaction costs
is to do with value (see Section 4). Delivering energy services such as flexibility has
multiple social and economic values that change according to network, social and
environmental context (Shipworth 2018) as well as space and time (Atkinson et al
2018). BEIS/Ofgem (2017) call for the stacking of such values across existing mar-
kets (capacity, wholesale, balancing and ancillary services) and emerging markets (at
distribution level and for new services).
Digital innovators, however, suggest that value assigned to resilience, customer
choice, environmental outcomes and customer equity should play an increasingly
important role (Pop et al 2018). This is also echoed by those calling for regulatory
reform in the shape of a less unit-price-sensitive value proposition that delivers wider
service benefits to the consumer while placing decarbonization at the heart of the
energy service system (Sandys et al 2018).
6 DISCUSSION
Digital innovations pose a challenge to energy system governance. Such innova-
tions, alongside advances in multiscalar energy generation and storage technologies
as well as business model innovation in energy and flexibility service provision,
are driving both the decentralization and the decarbonization of the energy system.
Their governance requires collective governance as an interlinked, interconnected
and interoperable community, which stands in contrast to existing energy governance
structures.
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Law, regulation and policy are no longer in control of the energy system origi-
nally designed around these supply-focused markets. Accountability is increasingly
located within networks, with law, regulation and policy taking on a facilitatory role
in the development of smart and flexible systems. The United Kingdom is not alone
in its struggle to engage and integrate a range of technological, economic and social
innovations promising consumer-oriented solutions to environmental problems. Yet,
the United Kingdom’s position – supposedly at the forefront of energy regulation
(Sandys et al 2018) – stands in contrast to its inherent policy bias toward incumbent
systems, especially in relation to nuclear power (Johnstone et al 2017).
In practice, however, the rapid diffusion of multiscalar generation and storage
technology as well as digital innovations is already disrupting market structures. The
automation of digital accounting and measuring, reporting and verification infras-
tructures, as well as the execution of smart contracts, is set to facilitate the deep
learning required for more accurate time series predictions; this lowers the risk of
opportunism, but questions arise regarding the role of the citizen both as a “pro-
sumer” and an energy data provider. This entails a process of disintermediation,
whereby suppliers alongside law, regulation and policy play a decreasing role while
innovative ESCOs, platform providers, communities and prosumers appear to be in
the process of reintermediation from the bottom up.
The result is an energy system in which digital innovations play a greater role
even though the extent and pace of change is unknown. In relation to the 4Ds of
decentralization, decarbonization, digitalization and democratization (Figure 1), UK
energy governance increasingly locates
 decentralized renewable energy at the intersection of policy/law/regulation,
DLT/EDT/BDA and citizens and prosumers, which currently fails to discour-
age grid and regulatory defection;
 flexibility at the intersection of grid infrastructure, DLT/EDT/BDA and policy/
law/regulation, even though citizens and prosumers will need to be engaged
because flexibility markets engaging “large players” only reach about 30% of
the energy load on the grid; and
 energy services at the intersection of grid infrastructure, DLT/EDT/BDA
and citizens and prosumers, largely in an unregulated space from an energy
governance perspective.
Whether the vision of digital innovators will be fulfilled, however, remains to
be seen. This is linked to the difficulty of (re-)locating value within energy sys-
tem transformation. Value creation needs to shift from fossil-fuel generation and
supply-focused markets toward progressive energy market governance. Value needs
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to be sourced from decarbonized, decentralized and digitized outcomes and based
on meaningful consent through democratization, especially regarding vulnerable
members of society.
Fairness and equity therefore need to be prioritized through a process of demo-
cratic, bottom-up citizen and community engagement to ensure that the costs of run-
ning the existing infrastructure (top of Figure 4, which will still be necessary no
matter how rapidly distributed systems evolve) will not be borne by fewer and less
fortunate consumers who lack the capacity to engage in these digital innovations
(right-hand side of Figure 4). Therefore, new governance approaches are required to
ensure that clean and flexible energy services will be available to all and created by
all at affordable costs.
This challenge is reflected by Ofgem’s dilemma of “whether it is financially ben-
eficial for network users to install their own on-site generation or storage in order to
reduce residual charges” while “facilitating effective decarbonisation of the energy
system at the lowest cost to all consumers but possibly also around innovation or
sustainable development” (Ofgem 2017b). At the same time, the power of top-
down governance in energy system transformation should not be underestimated,
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despite the abovementioned shift toward collective energy system governance with
an increasing emphasis being placed on private and community actors (Hoppe et al
2018; Saintier 2017).
For example, regulatory energy efficiency instruments in the United Kingdom
are estimated to have had a larger effect historically than economic fiscal/financial
energy efficiency instruments (DECC 2014; Eyre and Lockwood 2016). The con-
sequences of regulatory decentralization and defection, after all, do not necessitate
socially or environmentally beneficial outcomes. The more energy is governed out-
side of the scope of energy law, regulation and policy, the less effect changes in
regulation will have in alleviating overarching issues such as climate change and
inequality. This goes hand in hand with an overall loss of democratic accountability.
A culture change among regulators, standards developers and policy makers is
required to balance established interests and legacy systems that “keep the lights on”
by providing adequate services to those unable to adapt to the emergence of P2P and
platform trading. Part of this culture of change might entail a greater understanding
of the current trend toward exploiting latent flexibility, demand management and
DSR capacities inherent in existing infrastructures.
7 CONCLUSION
It is evident that the United Kingdom’s energy governance framework will need
to change to enable energy system transformation toward the 4Ds. Digital innova-
tions are enabling progress in some aspects, such as flexibility and demand-side
and frequency responses, while potentially inhibiting progress in others, especially
democratization, eg, by creating exclusive P2P trading environments.
The problem with energy system governance as it stands is that it is based on expe-
rience from the past. Regulating emerging technologies and facilitating beneficial
outcomes while limiting potential negative ones requires a fine balance and techno-
logical agnosticism in “leveling” the playing field in favor of organizations that seek
value creation beyond rent maximization. In this context, it is necessary to concep-
tualize decentralization and digitalization as value-free processes that can provide
or limit opportunities for value creation through democratization (social value) and
decarbonization (environmental value).
Those responsible for energy system governance need to proceed with caution and
change law, regulation and policy in accordance with an understanding of decentral-
ization and digitalization as vehicles that potentially, but do not necessarily, foster
decarbonized and democratized outcomes. Facilitating change needs to be reflexive
by taking a very wide range of statutory and nonstatutory requirements alongside
long-term (decarbonization) targets into account.
www.risk.net/journals Journal of Energy Markets
18 C. Nolden
In this context, it is necessary to bear in mind that it is not exclusively the
responsibility of BEIS, Ofgem and DNOs to alter regulation. The National Grid and
combined industry code panels governed by the Competition and Markets Author-
ity and determined by the Secretary of State, as well as citizens and communities
themselves, have a role to play. The drivers of change are also increasingly being
found in carbon pricing and trading, which is the remit of DEFRA. Ultimately, car-
bon emission reductions and inequality need to be the main determinants of value
creation in energy markets. Digital innovations provide the basis for data-driven
accounting, which allows carbon emission reductions and inequality to be commodi-
tized and automatically traded through (self-)regulated digital trading platforms.
Democratization needs to ensure that accountability remains in the public sphere.
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